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Posthumous Harm 
Steven Luper, Trinity University 
 
According to Epicurus (1966a,b), neither death, nor anything that occurs later, can harm 
those who die, because people who die are not made to suffer as a result of either.  In 
response, many philosophers (e.g., Nagel 1970, Feinberg 1984, and Pitcher 1984) have 
argued that Epicurus is wrong on both counts.  They have defended the mortem thesis:  
death may harm those who die.  They have also defended the post-mortem thesis:  
posthumous events may harm people who die.  Their arguments for this joint view are by 
now quite familiar, and there is no need to rehearse them here (for a summary, see Luper 
2002).  Instead, our topic is a third position, which carves out intermediate ground 
between the other two.  The intermediate view takes the mortem thesis for granted, like 
the critics of Epicurus, but rejects the post-mortem thesis, like Epicurus himself.  For 
Epicurus’ project—the attainment of ataraxia, or equanimity—the intermediate view is 
almost useless (we are not tranquil if we regard death as a tragedy whose peculiarity is 
that it frees us from the possibility of any further misfortune); however, it is far more 
plausible than Epicurus’ own position since it avoids his absurd claim that death cannot 
harm us, while retaining his view that events occurring while we are dead and gone 
cannot harm us.  According to the proponent of the intermediate view, when we 
understand the harm death inflicts, we must reject the idea that events following death 
can be bad for us.  The damage death itself does is so severe that people are not subject to 
harm by any subsequent events.  Thus the intermediate view rests on the mortem thesis 
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together with the immunity thesis:  death leaves its victims immune from posthumous 
harm.  
The immunity thesis is quite plausible.  Truly, once death is through with us, very 
little can be bad for us.  However, this essay will show that the immunity thesis faces 
significant objections.  Hence even though the mortem thesis is correct, the intermediate 
thesis is questionable.  The point is important, because of the consequences of the view 
that posthumous events are harmless to us.  One such consequence is that it is irrational 
to care how our reputations or personal projects will fare after we die.  It also follows that 
keeping our bodies alive after our brains enter a persistent vegetative state is not 
beneficial to us.  Moreover, there is a strong prima facie case for the view that others 
should feel free to set aside any instructions we might leave behind concerning the 
disposition of our material possessions.   
 
Death 
First a few words about the notion of death.  It has become customary to distinguish 
among the event, state, and process of death, where the event of death is the event by 
which one (permanently) ceases to exist, the process of death is the illness or decline that 
causes the event of death, and the state of death is the condition of nonexistence caused 
by the event of death.  This tripartite distinction is fine for many purposes, but misleading 
in one important respect:  it can suggest that the event of death is instantaneous, since all 
of the events leading up to it can be included under the rubric, “process” of death.  The 
notion that death is instantaneous, in turn, can foster the idea that death is just too quick 
to harm us.  The impression is especially vivid if we insist, with Epicureans, that harm 
 3 
consists in the presence in us of some unwelcome condition, such as a state of pain, and 
never in the mere absence or elimination of a welcome condition. 
To see how we might arrive at the idea that a quick death does not harm us, 
consider the notion that death is truly instantaneous.  Presumably, this means that, after 
the period of time when we are wholly alive, and before the period of time when we are 
not at all alive, no time passes.  On this picture, it appears that death cannot find a time to 
harm us.  After we are nonexistent it is too late for death to harm us, and while we are 
alive it is too early.  However, if our nonexistence follows immediately after our 
existence—if no time passes between the two—then everything that happens to us must 
occur either while we are alive or after we have ceased to be.  It seems impossible to 
wedge the harm of death in between, especially if we insist that harm entails the presence 
in us of an unwelcome, perhaps painful, condition.  Hence the impression that death 
might happen so fast it cannot harm us.   
The idea of an instantaneous death is coherent; it is possible to imagine something 
like it taking place, say in a science fiction tale about a death ray that takes one out, 
literally, in no time at all.  However, there is no reason whatever to suppose that anyone 
has ever moved from being wholly alive to being not at all alive so quickly that no time 
occurred.  It is obvious that, in the actual world, even the fastest deaths take time, and 
once we acknowledge this, it becomes obvious that we are fully alive when the transition 
of death begins, partially alive while it is underway, and not at all alive when it ends.  It is 
also clear that, other things being equal, the decline of the processes that constitute life is 
a straightforward kind of harm, and so is the failure of our mental and physical capacities.  
True enough, it may not involve the presence in us of some unwelcome condition such as 
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pain.  It is primarily a different kind of harm:  it is the elimination of good conditions 
present in (or, rather, partly constitutive of) us; it is the cessation of our vital life 
processes and capacities and various goods these make possible.   
However, if what we have just said is true, it is not difficult to assign a temporal 
location to (by far the most serious) part of the harm associated with death:  it happens at 
precisely the same time as death itself.  Death, and the harmful decline for which it is 
responsible, occur simultaneously.  And this remains true no matter how quickly death 
occurs.  What an ever-speedier death changes is that the harmful decline of our capacities 
happens faster and faster; nonetheless, if we can make sense of an instant death, we can 
also make sense of it instantly harming us in this way.  In itself, the elimination of life is 
harmful no matter how quickly it occurs.  From the standpoint of reducing our suffering, 
a quick death is better than a slow one, but a speedy death destroys our vital capacities 
just as effectively as a slow one. 
Philosophers influenced by Epicurus will reject our suggestion that death is a 
sequence of events in which life wanes until it is gone.  They will say that death is 
something that happens after any such sequence occurs:  it is the very last step into 
oblivion, and the extinction of the final burning ember is not harmful.  (J. Feinberg, 
following Levenbook 1984, goes so far as to define death as “the first moment of the 
subject’s nonexistence,” which makes death, in effect, a posthumous event!)  In taking 
this view, they bolster the Epicurean suggestion that death “is not something that ever 
coexists with the dying person for the time required for it to have a directly harmful effect 
on him (Feinberg 1984).”  They create the impression that the mortem thesis rests on the 
post-mortem thesis, so that, to defeat the former, all we need to do is defeat the latter. 
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Let us resist the Epicurean stratagems.  Admittedly, taking the final step into the 
void is not especially bad.  (Taking it might even be our best alternative if we are 
suffering.)  But that is because by then almost all of the damage is done.  Life, and the 
things it makes possible, is already nearly completely gone.  It is counterintuitive to 
define death as the final step of the series in which we lose life, and exclude, for instance, 
the step just before the last, when we have already lost 99.9999% of our capacities, or the 
step before that, when we have lost 99.9998%.  Moreover, anyone asking whether death 
is a bad thing is asking whether losing life is a bad thing, not whether, having nearly 
completely lost life, it is bad to lose the very last of it. 
 We can now turn to the intermediate view, according to which death, but nothing 
thereafter, can harm us.  Let’s illustrate how it can be defended on the basis of a rather 
simple-minded form of hedonism that supports the immunity thesis.  Then we can 
consider a more serious defense. 
 
Hedonist Defense 
Suppose we take the position that things are bad for us only if, and insofar as, they cause 
us increased pain or reduced pleasure.  (This is to be distinguished from Epicurus’s own 
view that harm consists solely in increased pain.)  Then we can defend the mortem thesis, 
since, all things being equal, the sooner death comes for us, the less pleasure we will 
experience in the course of our lives.  We can also support the immunity thesis.  No 
events subsequent to death can do, even in part, what death has done to perfection:  it 
brings our pleasure level down as far as it can go.  At the same time, it destroys our 
ability to feel any pain at all.  (And, obviously, posthumous events cannot reach into the 
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past, when we existed, to affect our levels of pleasure and pain, for no events can causally 
affect earlier states of affairs.) 
This hedonistic argument is useful because it illustrates how proponents of the 
intermediate view might support their main point:  while two sorts of events might harm 
us under various circumstances, the one might render the second incapable of harming us.  
For example, a vandal may harm you by (1) irreparably sanding away the images that are 
expertly painted on the canvas of your cherished painting, or (2) burning your painting, 
but if the vandal does the first of these things your artwork is valueless to you, and the 
vandal does you no further harm by burning your painting.  In a similar way, as the 
immunity thesis avers, the possible complaints against posthumous events are rendered 
moot by the harm caused by death itself.  The harm death does is straightforward in 
hedonistic terms:  it eliminates our capacity to experience pleasure; it prevents us from 
ever again enjoying ourselves.  It leaves nothing but a corpse.  But because death leaves 
only a corpse, there is no further harm a posthumous event can do us, at least as far as the 
hedonist is concerned. 
 However, this defense of the immunity thesis is implausible given its weak 
hedonistic moorings.  Nearly all theorists reject the hedonist criterion of harm as overly 
narrow.  Many things harm us without boosting our level of pain or reducing our level of 
pleasure.  For instance (Nagel 1970), we are harmed if we contract a disease that 
painlessly destroys our mental capacities and leaves us in the mental condition of a 
contented infant.  And (Nozick 1971) we are harmed if betrayed by a friend whether or 
not we ever find out or suffer as a result.  Such examples raise the possibility that 
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posthumous events may harm us even though death prevents them from affecting our 
level of pain or pleasure.   
 
The Harm as Deprivation Defense 
Let us construct a more plausible case for the intermediate view.  We can divide the 
defense into two parts.  First comes the argument for the mortem thesis, then the 
argument for the immunity thesis.   
The first task is relatively easy, for we can rely on the standard argument for the 
claim that death is harmful.  It starts with an assumption we can call the preclusion view 
of harm, according to which an event harms us if it prevents us from having something 
that would be good for us.  (More precisely, it harms us if it prevents us from having 
some good and fails to provide a benefit that fully compensates for the lost good.)  Here 
“having something” means either attaining or retaining it.  Given our assumption, we can 
show that death is potentially bad for us: 
1. Other things being equal, an event harms us if it prevents us from having 
(attaining or retaining) something that would be good for us (this is the preclusion 
view of harm). 
2. Death sometimes prevents us from having things that would be good for us. 
3. So sometimes death harms us.   
Some comments about the view of harm underlying this argument are in order.   
First.  The preclusion view allows for at least two different kinds of harms:  
destruction harms and preclusion harms.  The former involve the destruction of good 
conditions present in us, such as knowledge or abilities.  Death deals us destruction harms 
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when it annihilates living processes and abilities such as the capacity to know and love 
our families, and when it ends our existence as living beings.  In large part, it is because 
death is responsible for such destruction harms that we deplore it.  Death also deals us 
preclusion harms, which prevent us from acquiring goods, as when one dies just before 
marrying the love of one’s life. 
Second.  As we will understand the preclusion view, an event E that ensures that 
we will not have some good G has not necessarily prevented us from having G, and 
might never prevent us from having G, for our having G might have been out of the 
question all along, due to factors having nothing to do with E.  That is, it is possible that, 
even if E had not occurred, we still would not have had G, and in that case it is not 
accurate to say that E prevented us from having G.  Spelled out, then, the preclusion view 
of harm says that an event E harms us if there is a good G such that, first, if E were to 
occur, we would not attain or retain G, and second, if E were not to occur, we would (or 
at least might) attain or retain G.   
Third.  Our assumption speaks of a thing’s being good for us, yet the notion of 
goodness is highly controversial.  According to some theorists, the good should be given 
an objectivist analysis, because the claim that an item is good for us cannot be reduced to 
claims about the individual’s subjective point of view.  Other theorists develop a 
subjectivist analysis of the good; some, for example, will say that there is ultimately no 
way to understand goodness apart from the subjective standard of desire.  A thing’s being 
good for us simply reduces to its capacity to satisfy (one of) our desires, or our most 
important desires (which constitute the point of our main activities, or are involved in our 
identities), or perhaps those of our important desires that survive some sort of rational 
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scrutiny (Brandt 1979).  Subjectivists will be disinclined to speak of goods we in no sense 
desire, while objectivists will be comfortable in speaking of goods we fail to desire.  
Fortunately, there is no need to resolve these contentious issues.  In deference to both 
camps, we can assume that there are two ways an event E might benefit us as well as two 
corresponding ways it might harm us, and leave to the side the issue of whether the one 
collapses into the other.  On the one hand, E might benefit us by enabling us to have a 
good, or harm us by preventing us from having a good.  On the other hand, E might 
benefit us by satisfying a desire, or harm us by preventing the desire from being satisfied. 
 So much for the mortem thesis.  The next step is to defend the immunity thesis. 
Let us begin by acknowledging that our grounds for the mortem thesis seem to 
support the post-mortem thesis.  In fact, many theorists (Nagel 1970, Feinberg 1984, 
Pitcher 1984) defend both theses on the basis of the preclusion view of harm, for 
posthumous events as well as death seem capable of preventing us from attaining things 
that would be good for us.  So, offhand, it appears impossible for us to defend the 
immunity thesis if we support the mortem thesis on the grounds we have given. 
 But perhaps the appearances are misleading.  Even if we accept the preclusion 
view of harm, perhaps we can still show that the harm death deals us prevents any later 
events from harming us.  There might be two reasons posthumous events are unable to do 
further damage.   
First, death precludes our having any subsequent goods, and later events cannot 
preclude our having goods that are already out of reach.  We can attain or retain a good 
only while we exist, so whatever takes away our existence harms us by depriving us of 
the opportunity to have goods.  This death itself does.  But nothing that occurs after we 
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die will stop us from having a good since death has already done that job.  For example, it 
would be good for us if we were to become smarter or morally better, and bad for us to 
die and lose this opportunity, but nothing that occurs after we die will have any impact on 
our intellectual or moral progress. 
Second, it seems plausible to say that the (permanent) removal of a desire either 
(a) thwarts it or (b) ensures that it cannot be harmfully thwarted.  Either way, since death 
removes all of our desires, subsequent events cannot harm us:  they cannot thwart desires 
that are already thwarted, and the remaining desires do not matter.  Let’s spell this 
argument out in a bit more detail, starting with case (a). 
The notions of ‘satisfying’ and ‘thwarting’ a desire can use some clarification.  As 
to ‘satisfying’:  it is particularly important to notice that satisfaction need not involve 
gratification.  To satisfy the desire for, say, X is to realize X, not necessarily to gain 
pleasure upon realizing X.  If, on a dare, you conceive, and satisfy, a desire to leap into 
boiling water, you will have satisfied your desire, but gained no gratification thereby.  As 
to ‘thwarting’:  a desire is thwarted if it is never either satisfied or voluntarily given up 
before satisfaction becomes impossible (Luper 1996, p. 30).  A desire we willingly 
abandon through the normal processes, perhaps after rational deliberation, can no longer 
be thwarted. When people cease to desire to pursue some career because other options 
prove more compelling, or because onlookers persuade them that other careers are more 
desirable, their desire is not thwarted.  But when, against their wills, their desire is 
removed by drugs or some form of brainwashing, it is almost always thwarted.  (What if 
someone manipulates you, against your will, so as to make you desire something far less 
than before?  We might well count such manipulation as a way of thwarting your desire; 
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but even if we do not, we will consider it harmful for others to manipulate us so as to 
cause us to care less about the things we want.) 
We can now see that, often, what (permanently) removes a desire thwarts it, by 
ruling out the possibility of its being satisfied (Luper 1987, p. 271).  Consider three 
examples.  First.  Suppose that you badly want to become a brain surgeon, and have a real 
prospect of becoming one if you dedicate yourself completely to the effort.  But one night 
an enemy pours an elixir into your ear that completely eliminates your desire.  In so 
doing, your enemy ensures that you will not satisfy the desire, and then any further 
roadblocks to your becoming a surgeon become moot.  One might argue that death does 
something comparable vis-à-vis most of your desires:  it thwarts them by removing them, 
with the consequence that later events cannot thwart the thwarted desires.  Second.  It is 
(somewhat) bad when death stops you from enjoying playing chess, yet you are not 
harmed if, after you die, the game is banned, ensuring that you could not play even if you 
were still alive with a healthy desire to play.  And third.  It is unfortunate for you if death 
ends your effort to be the first person to swim across Lake Michigan; nonetheless, you 
are not harmed if, after you die, someone else is first to make the swim.   
Case (b) involves desires that are capable of being thwarted after they have been 
removed.  It seems possible to argue that the thwarting of a desire after the desire is 
removed is not harmful on the grounds that we can be harmfully deprived of something 
only during times when we desire it.  The thought is that satisfying, at time t, the desire to 
have some item A would be good for us (and the thwarting, at t, of the desire for A would 
be bad for us) only if, at t, we desire A.  This suggestion, which we can call the 
preferential condition for harm (and benefit), will force us to modify the preclusion view 
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of harm slightly.  We must say that an event harms us if, at time t, it prevents us from 
having some item that we desire at t. But given the modified view, together with the 
preferential condition for harm, it seems reasonable to conclude that, while death can 
harm us by removing (and simultaneously thwarting) our desires, posthumous events 
cannot harm us even if they thwart desires death fails to thwart yet takes away.   
 
Response to the Harm as Deprivation Defense 
As to the first part of this defense of the intermediate view, we have no complaint:  we 
grant that death can harm us by precluding our having goods or by thwarting our desires.  
What about the second part, concerning the immunity thesis? 
The arguments for the immunity thesis relied on two main assumptions:  first, 
anything that takes away our existence deprives us of any further opportunity to attain 
goods or to be deprived of them, and second, anything that takes away our desires thwarts 
them or ensures that they cannot be harmfully thwarted.  Are these assumptions correct? 
 The first assumption does capture an important fact, namely, that few goods are 
made available to us by events that occur after we cease to exist; events that occur while 
we are alive determine whether we will acquire or lose most goods.  Included among 
these goods are abilities, such as the gift of powerful vision, which would be destroyed 
were death to take away our existence; obviously, nothing that happens later could make 
us unable to retain the vision we have already lost.  Also included are projects that cannot 
succeed unless we carry them to fruition.  Typically, personally defined projects, or 
projects we define in terms of ourselves, are like this (these do not exhaust the ‘dependent 
goals’ discussed in “Annihilation” (Fischer 275)).  For example, suppose we want to 
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write a great novel, or to be the first to swim across Lake Michigan.  (These are 
personally defined projects since what we want is that we should write a great novel, and 
that we should be the first to swim the lake.)  Suppose, too, that it would be good for us to 
complete our project.  Truly, events occurring while we are alive determine whether we 
will attain these goods; if something (permanently) takes away our existence it prevents 
us from completing projects which, by their very nature, only we can complete.   
 Nevertheless, some goods can be made available to us by events that occur after 
we cease to exist, and we may be harmed by events that deprive us of these goods.  By 
way of illustration, consider something we might as well call an impersonally defined 
project, to contrast it with the personally defined projects discussed earlier.  Suppose that 
what we want is that some project, say that of curing lung cancer within ten years, be 
completed (whether or not we ourselves are responsible for its coming to fruition).  This 
might be an endeavor in which we personally have a great deal at stake; perhaps we 
initiated it, and have invested into it a great deal of time and energy.  So it would be good 
for us if the undertaking were successful, and bad if it were not.  (Let us add that we 
might understand a project under both personal and impersonal definitions:  perhaps one 
wants to cure cancer oneself but, failing that, one wants it cured by someone.)  Even if we 
are deprived of existence, subsequent events might bring it about that lung cancer is 
cured, or that it is not cured.  We will not be responsible for the success that is good for 
us or for the failure that is bad:  that will be out of our hands.  Instead, the good success 
or bad failure will be brought about for us.   
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 Nor are impersonally defined projects the only goods that can be made available 
to us by events that occur after we cease to exist.  Retaining a good reputation after we 
die is a further example; so is having our wills honored by our heirs.   
Apparently, then, there are intuitively plausible examples of goods we can be 
robbed of by events that take place after we no longer exist, and hence plausible 
examples of posthumous harms.  However, it is possible to resist the conclusion that 
these are genuine cases of posthumous benefit and harm.  Resistance can be motivated by 
the timing puzzle, which is a difficulty concerning the dating of good things and bad 
things for which posthumous events are responsible.  We have seen that much of the 
harm associated with death occurs at the same time as death.  The harm (or benefit) death 
itself brings about at the very time it occurs is not puzzling.  But when does an event 
occurring after we are gone benefit or harm us?  The idea that posthumous events harm or 
benefit us seems mysterious, since it is hard to understand when we incur the relevant 
harm or benefit.  (Either we incur it before death, at the time of death, or later; but the 
first two answers seem to be ruled out by the presumption that an event cannot harm us 
before it occurs, and the third answer seems ruled out by the presumption that an event 
cannot harm any item while that item is nonexistent.)  Unless we can solve the timing 
puzzle, it will be tempting to dismiss as illusory our examples of posthumous harm and 
benefit. 
More than one response to the timing puzzle is possible, but the best is Pitcher’s, 
and it is persuasive.  According to Pitcher, we receive the harm or good associated with a 
posthumous event while we are alive.  To explain how this works, let us distinguish 
between a direct and an indirect harm.  Let us say that an event that is responsible for our 
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coming to be in a bad condition is an indirect harm, while the bad condition itself is the 
direct harm.  For example, if we set a bomb to go off fifty years later, maiming a man 
who is not yet alive, we have indirectly harmed the man, and the injuries sustained by the 
man are direct harms.  On Pitcher’s view, posthumous events can only be indirect harms.  
The corresponding direct harms are certain facts about us that come to hold by virtue of 
the posthumous events that occur much later.  If, for instance, Sarah’s final wishes are 
ignored, the proposition ‘her will is to be ignored’ is true of Sarah while she has these 
wishes; indirectly, she is harmed by the activities of those who set aside her will, but the 
corresponding direct harm is its being true of her that her will is to be ignored.  She 
incurs this harm while she has her final wishes.  In sum, posthumous events that harm us 
do so indirectly.  Partly because of these events, ‘certain desires of ours will be thwarted, 
certain goods unattained’ is true of us, and its being true of us is the direct harm for 
which the corresponding posthumous events are responsible.  We incur this direct harm 
precisely when ‘certain desires of ours will be thwarted, certain goods unattained’ is true 
of us. 
 Strictly speaking, then, the living and not the dead are harmed by posthumous 
events.  By the time we are dead, the (direct) harm for which a posthumous event is 
(indirectly) responsible has already been received.   
Now consider the second assumption used in defense of the immunity thesis.  
According to this assumption, anything that takes away our desires thwarts them or 
ensures that they cannot be harmfully thwarted.  Like the first, this second assumption 
has its elements of truth.  Many desires are thwarted when removed.  If something 
(permanently) removes our desire to finish a project only we can complete, it thwarts that 
 16 
desire.  To remove our desire to write a great novel is to thwart it.  Clearly, a person with 
a desire of this sort can be harmed by death, but, other things being equal, subsequent 
events will not compound the misfortune.  (Using Pitcher’s suggestion, we can put the 
point this way:  because of Sarah’s death itself, ‘her desire to write a great novel is to be 
unsatisfied’ is true of Sarah, and this is a direct harm.)  Among those desires that are not 
thwarted when removed, there are also two groups of desires that cannot be harmfully 
thwarted after being removed.  First, there are desires we voluntarily abandon, like the 
childhood ambition to be a fireman, or a poet (Parfit 157).  These desires cannot be 
harmfully thwarted because, being given up, they cannot be thwarted at all.  Second, 
there are desires that are conditional on their own persistence (Parfit 151).  That is, for 
some items A, satisfying, at t, the desire to have A is not good for us, and failing, at t, to 
satisfy the desire to have A is not bad for us, unless, at t, we desire to have A.  The most 
obvious examples are items that are beneficial to us only insofar as we enjoy satisfying 
the desire for them.  Such goods can be grasped in hedonistic terms.  Having—or 
lacking—licorice does not matter to us if we do not like to eat it.  We can be harmfully 
deprived of the desire for such items, since we will have lost a way of amusing ourselves, 
but it is plausible to say that we can be deprived of the items themselves only during 
times when we desire them.  Remove the desire, and you eliminate any subsequent 
possibility of harmfully thwarting it.   
However, not all desires are thwarted when removed, and not all desires are 
incapable of being harmfully thwarted after being removed.  There are intuitively 
plausible examples of harm brought about by the thwarting of desires we no longer have, 
and there is a good explanation of when we undergo such harm.  The point may be 
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illustrated using examples we discussed earlier.  Consider an impersonally defined 
project, our interest in which is not purely hedonistic, such as the timely discovery of a 
cure for cancer:  even if, against our will, something removes our desire that lung cancer 
be cured, thus ending our efforts toward that end, subsequent events might bring it about 
that our desire is satisfied.  So removing it need not thwart it.  What is more, events 
occurring after it is removed might be harmful.  For someone who wants an impersonally 
defined project to succeed, posthumous events can be damaging in their own right.  It 
might be occurrences that follow death, rather than death itself, that determine that the 
project will fail.  As to when we are harmed by our project’s demise, the best explanation 
is Pitcher’s:  ‘one’s desire that there be a timely cure for cancer is to be unsatisfied (yet 
never voluntarily given up)’ is not made true of one by one’s death; however, it might be 
made true of one in part by subsequent events.  In that case these events harm indirectly.  
Directly, we are harmed while it is true of us that our desire that there be a timely cure for 
cancer is to be unsatisfied. 
 There are other examples of harm brought about by the thwarting of desires we no 
longer have.  Most of us care specifically about what will happen after we die.  We want 
our reputations to remain unsullied after we die.  We want the executors of our wills to 
honor our instructions.  And we do not want our bodies kept alive after our brains are 
dead.  Death will not thwart these desires, but posthumous events might well, and if they 




We have seen that posthumous events cannot harm us in some of the ways death can.  For 
example, unlike the latter, the former are never responsible for destruction harms, which 
are significant sources of fear since these are entailed by our annihilation as living beings.  
We have also seen that death can be responsible for many preclusion harms for which 
posthumous events are therefore not responsible.  In particular, the former, and not the 
latter, end most of our projects.  Nevertheless, the immunity thesis is not entirely true:  
death does not leave us unsusceptible to further harm.  Posthumous events may interfere 
with our impersonally defined projects.  And they may thwart desires concerned 
specifically with what will happen after we die.   
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